Existing distributed denial-of-service attack detection in software defined networks (SDNs) typically perform detection in a single domain. In reality, abnormal traffic usually affects multiple network domains. Thus, a cross-domain attack detection has been proposed to improve detection performance. However, when participating in detection, the domain of each SDN needs to provide a large amount of real traffic data, from which private information may be leaked. Existing multiparty privacy protection schemes often achieve privacy guarantees by sacrificing accuracy or increasing the time cost. Achieving both high accuracy and reasonable time consumption is a challenging task. In this paper, we propose Predis, which is a privacypreserving cross-domain attack detection scheme for SDNs. Predis combines perturbation encryption and data encryption to protect privacy and employs a computationally simple and efficient algorithm k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) as its detection algorithm. We also improve kNN to achieve better efficiency. Via theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that Predis is capable of achieving efficient and accurate attack detection while securing sensitive information of each domain. He has authored over 260 journal and conference papers in these areas, and a book (Springer). His research interests are wireless communications, wireless networks, security, and systems. He has been awarded over $5 million U.S. dollars research grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation, Army Research Office, Air Force Research Laboratory, NASA, the State of Pennsylvania, and Amazon. He is a Life Member of ACM. He serves on the editorial boards of three international journals.
I. INTRODUCTION
S OFTWARE defined networks (SDNs) have emerged as a new networking paradigm that is liberated from vertical integration in traditional networks and offers programs and networks flexibility via a centralized logical network controller [1] . The controller abstracts an entire network view into network services and provides an easy-to-use interface for operators to facilitate customization of privatization applications and realize the logical management of a network. Users of an SDN do not need to worry about the technical details of the underlying devices. SDNs simplify network management and adapt to current situations in which the network size continues to rapidly expand. Manuscript However, the features of centralized control and programming render SDNs susceptible to network attacks. Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have become a severe type of threat to the Internet, where attackers usually use a vast number of geographically distributed compromised hosts as puppet machines to launch denial-of-service attacks on a specific target. A recent report reveals that DDoS attacks account for 22% of the 2015 data center downtime [2] . In SDNs, the controller, which has a crucial role in determining the functionality of each network component, may be exposed to DDoS attacks [3] . A compromised controller would cause paralysis or misbehaving of all switches under its control [4] .
DDoS attacks operate in three steps, i.e., scanning, intrusion, and attack launching. Abnormal traffic of DDoS attacks usually affects multiple paths and network domains (e.g., SDNs domains). For ease of illustration, we analyze the stages of typical DDoS attacks using datasets collected by the Lincoln Laboratory [5] of MIT-LLDOS 1.0-as shown in Table I . Prior to the launch of an attack, abnormal traffic can be observed at the stages of scanning and intrusion. If the victim and the puppet machines under DDoS attacks were located in different network domains, a detection attempt that is restricted within a single domain would be unable to identify the attacks at their primary stages. Thus, the involvement of multiple domains in attack detection will help to achieve more accurate and timely detections. DDoS attacks may involve forging of IP addresses of the puppet machines, which complicates the identification and defeat of the attacks.
In SDNs, collaborative detection across multiple domains requires detailed traffic data of each involved domain, such as the content of the flow table in the latest seconds. However, this data collection may cause serious privacy concerns for the SDNs operators, because the traffic data reveal sensitive information, such as source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, and traffic statistics, which have potential utility in mining network topology and network connection behaviors [6] - [8] . As a result, SDN operators are reluctant to share their detailed intra-domain traffic data with each other. Therefore, tradeoffs between attack detection efficiency and privacy protection should be carefully balanced in SDNs.
Many schemes for DDoS attack detection in traditional networks have been proposed and have demonstrated promising results [9] - [15] . Extensive solutions for DDoS attack detection in SDNs, which employ various detection techniques, such as Bayesian networks [16] , the entropy variation of the destination IP address [17] , and the support vector machine (SVM) model [18] , have also been proposed. 0733 -8716 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Although these DDoS attack detection schemes are usually restricted to a single domain [19] , few studies have considered cross-domain attack detection. Bian et al. [20] proposed a scheme for cross-domain DDoS attack detection in SDNs using a self-organizing map (SOM) as the traffic classifier. The calculation in the training and the test phases, however, is complicated and requires multiple vector multiplication or complex division. Secure multi-party computation (SMC) [21] , [22] may enable secure cross-domain anomaly detection (e.g., secure addition protocol, secure multiplication protocol, and secure compare protocol). These protocols, however, require numerous interactions among the participants and calculations on ciphertext, which undoubtedly consumes a significant percentage of the controller's bandwidth. Cross-domain attack detection will cause privacy leakage, whereas the introduction of privacy protection is usually characterized by excessive time consumption and a low detection rate. We should address these challenges when detecting DDoS attacks in a cross-domain. The first challenge is to conduct cross-domain DDoS attack detection in SDNs without revealing privacy of each network domain. Attack detection classifiers require detailed traffic data, and SDNs domains do not trust each other. We must address the privacy issue when multiple SDNs domains work together to perform anomaly detection. The second challenge is to ensure efficient and accurate DDoS attack detection while preserving privacy. The trade-off for strong privacy protection in multi-party cooperation is low accuracy and high time consumption, and assigning priority to involved parties is challenging. To address these dilemmas, we decouple the detection into two stepdisturbance and detection-and introduce two servers that collaborate to complete the detection process.
We employ perturbation encryption to protect the privacy of each network domain. With a careful design, the ciphertext produced by perturbation encryption can be directly calculated in servers without the need to involving complex secure computation protocols. We leverage the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide privacy and communications data integrity among the two servers and the SDN controllers.
With respect to the second challenge, we apply the k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) algorithm as a traffic classifier because kNN is not sensitive to outliers and noises in datasets, and its effectiveness has been demonstrated in many recent studies [23] , [24] . To customize the typical kNN in an encrypted environment, we decompose the distance calculation process into two step, which enables the well-known Euclidean distance 1 using the perturbed traffic information. 1 The formula of the European distance d of an n-dimensional vector x is
Our contributions are summarized as follows: 1) We propose Predis, which is a privacy-preserving cross-domain DDoS attack detection scheme for SDNs that considers both cross-domain DDoS attack detection and privacy protection in multi-party cooperation. Predis employs the features of SDNs and the improved kNN algorithm to accurately detect DDoS attacks within an effective time and applies perturbation encryption to provide confidentiality and ensure a participant's privacy. 2) We prove the security of Predis by an asymptotic approach of computational security in modern cryptography. By a rigorous security analysis, we prove that the traffic data provided by each participant are indistinguishable for a potential adversary. 3) We conduct extensive experiments using multiple authoritative datasets to demonstrate the timeliness and accuracy of Predis. We demonstrate that our scheme not only can determine if traffic is abnormal but also can identify abnormal traffic at the early stages of DDoS attacks. The results indicate that Predis is more accurate than existing detection schemes and is capable of protecting participants' privacy. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We review related work in Section II and introduce the threat model and security goals in Section III. We introduce the improved kNN algorithm in Section IV and describe the design of Predis and the concrete calculation steps and encryption details in Section V. We present the security analysis in Section VI and the experimental results in Section VII. We present a brief discussion in Section VIII and conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED STUDIES

A. Background of DDoS Attacks
A denial of service (DoS) attack can expire the resources of a system on the target computer, stop services and leave its normal users inaccessible. When hackers use two or more compromised computers on the network as puppet machines to launch DoS attacks on a specific target, these attacks are referred to as DDoS attacks.
DDoS attackers can simultaneously control several computers and create an attack architecture that contains control puppets and attack puppets, as shown in Figure 1 . Attackers usually employ a vast number of geographically distributed compromised hosts as puppet machines to launch DoS attacks on a specific target. Traditional attack architecture is analogous to a dumbbell-shaped structure, in which an intermediate network is only responsible for data forwarding and security events and control functions are entirely conducted by management, whereas the network does not have the ability to detect and handle network attacks quickly.
B. Summary of DDoS Attack Detection Methods
Numerous studies of DDoS attack detection exist due to the severity and prevalence of DDoS attacks. Here, we briefly summarize related studies from two perspectives, i.e., DDoS attack detection in conventional networks and DDoS attack detection in SDNs, as listed in Table II. 1) Detection in Conventional Networks: Detection approaches of DDoS attacks in conventional networks have been extensively investigated; methods such as entropy-based [10] , SVM [11] , naive Bayesian [13] , neural network [14] , cluster analysis [15] , artificial neural network (ANN) [12] , and kNN [9] methods, are employed as classifiers.
2) Detection in SDNs: An SDN controller collects information about flow table and uses selected classifiers to classify network traffic flows as either normal or abnormal. Based on the capability of a logical centralized controller and the programmability of a network, network administrators can immediately respond to attacks. Classic classification methods, such as Bayesian networks [16] and SVMs [18] , as well as neural networks of SOMs [20] , [25] , [26] and deep learning [27] , are employed as traffic classifiers in SDNs.
These proposed methods typically consider attack detection in a single domain, which usually requires complex calculations, such as vector multiplication and division, during the test phase. For instance, the calculation formula of a naive
, where x is the test instance, d is the dimension of x, and y is the class mark. The time complexity of an SVM, Bayesian network and cluster analysis are O(n 3 ), O(n 3 ) and O(nkt), respectively, where n is the number of training samples, k is the number of clusters and t is the number of iterations. Deep learning is recognized as a complex algorithm that requires numerous computing resources for calculations; its time complexity is O(f (n)), where f (n) is a function of the algorithm's built-in module. If these methods are directly conducted for crossdomain attack detection, secure computation protocols will be needed to solve the privacy protection. Predis not only protects privacy but also avoids the extensive interactions and calculations that are required when secure computation protocols are employed.
Bian et al. [20] proposed a scheme based on an SOM, which considered both cross-domain DDoS attack detection and privacy protection. The time complexity of training a neural network and training a test are O(nm 2 ) and O(m 2 ), respectively, where m is the number of neurons and n is the number of training samples. As a type of instance-based learning (or lazy learning) algorithm, kNN only needs a test phase, which has the time complexity of O(n) in Predis. In addition, they failed to consider the detection of DDoS attacks at their early stages. We attempt to identify an anomaly at the early stages of DDoS attacks. If we identify an anomaly prior to the stage of attacking, we can implement countermeasures (e.g., by blocking ingress traffic with certain attack characteristics) to avoid further losses [28] . However, this importance has hardly been realized in prior studies. Mousavi and St-Hilaire [17] proposed a method to detect DDoS attacks in SDNs and claims that this method can detect DDoS attacks within the first five-hundred packets of the attack traffic. If the puppet machines and the victim are in different SDNs domains, traffic will not be reflected as being abnormal.
C. Privacy Preserving in Cross-Domain Detection
An SDN domain in Predis refers to a controlled domain in an SDN architecture, which is a network domain with the deployment of SDN techniques that can be independently controlled by operators. The domains of the SDNs conduct centralized control of data forwarding. The domains of the multiple SDNs described in our article collaborate and may be adjacent to a physical or geographical location. The control plane of a centralized SDN domain sends a flow table to a specified location (i.e., computing server). The computing server provides the DDOS detection service and return detection results controllers. Traditional network domains for traffic forwarding is a distributed control and cannot achieve centralized control [29] , [30] .
Privacy-preserving cross-domain attack detection is a secure multi-party computation (SMC) problem [31] , which entails how to safely calculate a function when a credible third party is not present. Some studies [32] - [35] have addressed this issue. Chen et al. [36] present a cryptographic protocol that is specially devised for privacy-preserving cross-domain routing optimization in SDNs. However, their methods do not consider the problem of cross-domain attack detection. Martin et al. [37] investigated the practical usefulness of solutions based on SMC and have designed optimized secure multiparty computation operations that efficiently operated with voluminous input data. Although their method may provide a new insight into the problem in this paper, their application scenarios differ from our application scenarios.
Predis employs the kNN algorithm as a classifier to perform DDoS attack detection. Since the kNN technique has been employed to solve privacy-preserving problems, several eminent secure kNN protocols exist. Wong et al. [38] proposed ASPE, which is a protocol that preserved a special type of scalar product and constructed two secure schemes that supported kNN computation on encrypted data. Elmehdwi et al. [39] set up SkNN, which provided better security in solving the kNN query problem for an encrypted database outsourced to a cloud. These secure kNN protocols focus on the application of a kNN to query encrypted data. A secure kNN inspires us to address DDoS attack detection, which demands high accuracy and an immediate response and differs from the querying problem over encrypted data.
Compared with previous studies about DDoS attack detection, Predis not only considers the detection of DDoS attacks over multiple domains with privacy-preserving but also attempts to detect DDoS attacks at their early stages.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we provide an overview of the system model and the roles involved in Predis. We present the threat model and the security goals.
A. System Model
Predis contains three roles: computing server (CS), detection server (DS) and SDN domains, 2 as exhibited in Figure 2 (a). Domain D n is the n-th domain, which participates in attack detection, provides data to CS and DS.
The system sequence diagram is shown in Figure 2 (b). Each domain sends traffic information to CS for calculation and receives the detection results from DS. CS provides computing service and sends the intermediate results to DS, where the latter provides detection service based on the intermediate results and replies the detection results to each domain. Thus, CS and DS perform collaboration to perform computations. Details of the computation and encryption in CS and DS are described in Section V.
Predis provides accurate DDoS attack detection service for domains, where each domain is unwilling to share privacy traffic information. Here, we provide a formal definition of privacy:
Definition 1 (Privacy): The information in the flow table pertains to domains that participate in the detection. Specifically, privacy includes the IP Source, IP Destination, Source Port, Destination Port, Length, and Flow Packets.
We define the basic operations in Predis for the three roles as three functions with inputs and outputs. Each function is designed to run on continuous inputs in real time using the data partitioned into a certain time interval. Predis has a set of n input peers who want to jointly compute the final result of Predis on their private data without the slightest relevant disclosure. Predis has m players, which are referred to as privacy peers; they perform the computation of Predis by simulating a trusted third party (TTP) [37] . Domains comprise both input peers and privacy peers, whereas both CS and DS are privacy peers.
B. Threat Model
We abstract the cross-domain privacy-preserving DDoS attack detection problem with a threat model. The threat model has two types of adversaries, namely, the external adversary and the semi-honest adversary [40] .
1) External Adversary: Adversaries that illegally obtain the data in the transmission process for their purposes via Internet eavesdropping or data interception and other means.
2) Semi-Honest Adversary: A curious participant who properly follows the protocol to fulfill service functions but attempts to infer sensitive or private information from the intermediate results of calculation or even colludes with other participants.
Privacy peers will set up a secure, confidential and authentic channel that connects to their peers to resist the external adversary [41] . In Predis, we employ TLS to build this secure channel, which provides the privacy and data integrity of two communicating entities. We adopt the semi-honest assumption for all privacy peers. Honest privacy peers follow the protocol and do not combine their information. Semihonest privacy peers follow the protocol but try to infer the input peers' privacy from the values that they learn and by combining their information. Domains hope to obtain the correct results of attack detection. While following the proper steps, some domains may try to infer other domains' privacy for certain purposes. CS and DS will provide the appropriate calculation service but may use the intermediate results that are generated by the intermediate steps in the calculation to infer and spy privacy from the domains.
We assume that all privacy peers have the potential to be external adversary via eavesdropping or other methods to illegally obtain input peers' privacy. In addition to the roles included in this program, any other external eavesdropper is an adversary that we need to address.
C. Security Goal
The purpose of this paper is to obtain accurate crossdomain DDoS attack detection results under the premise of privacy protection. Privacy peers may steal privacy as external adversaries or semi-honest adversaries. Privacy peers may collude with each other. In our solution, we allow at least one domain to collude with each other, with CS, and with DS. We make the following assumptions: 1) Each domain honestly performs functions but may have an interest in the private information of other domains. 2) CS or DS correctly performs the calculation process but may have an interest in obtaining domains' private information. 3) CS or DS may collude with at least one domain. Semihonest privacy peers follow the protocol but attempt to infer peers' privacy from the values that they learn. Thus, CS or DS may collude with at least one domain. 4) CS and DS do not collude with each other. In reality, DS and CS can be deployed by different operators.
Operators are likely to have conflicts of interest; thus, CS is assumed to not collude with DS. Prior to describing our security goals, we introduce a security definition (i.e., Definition 2), an adversarial indistinguishability experiment P rivK A·π (n), as shown in Table III , and a definition of negligible (i.e., Definition 3) for a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary (A) [42] . .
We aim to achieve the security objective of maintaining the privacy of each domain. We specify our security goals as follows:
1) For CS and DS, input peers' privacy is protected.
2) For domains, other input peers' privacy is protected.
IV. CLASSIFICATION METHOD
To adapt to the proposed privacy protection scheme, we design a classifier by the kNN algorithm, decouple it into two step and embed the encryption steps into the classifier. In this section, we discuss how traffic classification is performed.
A. Improved kNN as Classifier
In general, kNN is implemented by linear scanning. In linear scanning, we need to calculate every distance between the test data and the training data and then sort and obtain the Algorithm 1 Improved kNN Algorithm Input: Training datasets D t , test instance t, timeout limit L. Output: Detection result y. 1: Build kd-tree based on the dimensions of the training data in CS. 2: Calculate the preliminary results from the ordered training data in CS. 3: Remove the perturbation from the preliminary results to obtain the correct distance in DS. 4: t as the root is added to the traversal queue 5: Initialize the queue Q k . 6: while traversal queue is not null and (L! = 0) do 7: node ← traversal queue' top. 8: Obtain the distance between node and t distance. 9: if distance < Q k 's top then 10: remove Q k 's top.
11:
Insert node to Q k . 12: if node's n-th dimension's value t's n-th dimension's value then 13: node's left children enters traversal queue.
14:
Traverse right subtree.
15:
else 16: node's right children enters traversal queue.
17:
Traverse left subtree. 18: Obtain the detection result y by queue Q k . 19 : return y.
nearest k instances. When the training dataset is very large, the computation will be very time-consuming.
A kd-tree is a balanced binary tree that divides an entire attribute space into specific d parts according to the number of attributes of the dataset and then performs relevant query operations in a specific space. Best bin first (BBF) is an optimization algorithm for querying on a kd-tree, the main idea of which is to sort the nodes in the querying path, and retroactive checking is always performed from the best-priority tree node. Using a kd-tree to store a training dataset and search with BBF not only do not requires every distance between the test data and the training data to be calculated but also improves the efficiency. Readers interested in kd-tree or BBF can refer to the literature [43] ; because these studies do not focus of Predis, we do not discuss them in this paper.
In Section III, we have introduced the system model, in which CS has the training dataset, and DS provides detection service. We decoupled kNN into two step: In the first step, CS builds a kd-tree based on the training dataset and calculates the preliminary results of the distance between the test data and the ordered training data. In the second step, DS obtains the preliminary results and the nearest k instances using BBF. The time complexity of kNN with a linear scan is O (n log k), and the time complexity of kNN with BBF is O(n), where n is the number of training data. When the dataset is large, the reduction in time consumption by BBF is very impressive. The main steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Feature Selection
The proposed DDoS attack detection scheme is based on the flow table obtained from SDNs controllers. Due to the large amount of redundant information in the table, which affects not only the detection efficiency but also the results, we extract feature information from the flow table. Normal traffic is generally interactive because its purpose is to obtain or provide services. However, the number of ports and source IP addresses will significantly increase when DDoS attacks occur. Another feature of DDoS attacks is source IP spoofing, which usually generates a substantial amount of traffic with a small number of packets with a small number of bytes. Normal flow usually has many packets, and the number of bytes of the flow is large. Thus, we calculate the median of packets per flow and the bytes per flow to reinforce this feature instead of the mean, because the mean can possibly smooth this feature.
To quantify these characteristics, five parameters are used in the feature selection module, including MPF, MBF, PCF, GOP and GSI, which are elaborated as follows:
1) Median of Packets per Flow (MPF), which describes the median number of packets in every n flow. We rank the flows X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n } in ascending order based on the number of packets per flow, and then compute the median value according to Formula (1) .
2) Median of Bytes per Flow (MBF), which describes the median number of bytes in every n flow. We rank the flows in ascending order based on the number of bytes per flow and then compute the median value. In this section, we describe the workflow of Predis and the processes for combining privacy protection in DDoS attack detection.
A. Traffic Pretreatment in Domains
In traffic pretreatment, domains need to collect traffic and abstract each piece of traffic information as a seven-tuple and generate a perturbation parameter. The obtained seven-tuple is encrypted by the perturbation parameter. Domains transmit the for ∀t ∈ T do 4: for i ← 0 < 6 do 5:
Random generation disturbance parameter r = {0, 1} 231 .
6:
Δt i = t i + r. 7: for ∀Δt ∈ ΔT do 8: C CS ← Enc skc (Δt).
9:
for ∀r∈ R do 10: C DS ← Enc skd (r).
11:
return C DS to DS. 12: return C CS to CS.
encrypted seven-tuple to CS and the perturbation parameter to DS, as shown in Algorithm 2. Domains collect and transmit traffic information every three seconds since an overly long interval can paralyze a network before the attacks are detected, whereas an overly short interval can render the resource utilization of the detection module to become too high to handle other requests in the controller, which can cause a substantial load on the link between the controller and its switches.
As mentioned in Section IV-B, the information needed for detection are the source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, flow bytes, and flow packets. Domains undergo the process detailed in the flow table with the equations described in Section IV-B and calculate the MPF, MBF, PCF, GOP and GSI. We define a seven-tuple as Serial Number, Time, MPF, MBF, PCF, GOP and GSI. The functions Serial Number and Time are similar to the primary key in the relational database. This key is a label that uniquely identifies this flow table item, which is generated by domains. In the experiments, we establish the Serial Number as the number n for the n-th domain that participates in detection and Time as the timestamp of the flow table item. Each attribute in the seventuple is stored as a binary of 33 bits (we add an additional bit as an overflow flag), and the total length of the seven-tuple is 231 bits. Attributes less than 33 bits will be filled with zero in front.
In each domain, the disturbance parameter is added to the seven-tuple. Using the TLS, domains securely deliver the encrypted seven-tuple to CS and the disturbance parameter to DS. The flow table content is shown in Figure 3(a) , and a schematic of the traffic pretreatment in the domains is shown in Figure 3(b) .
B. Preliminary Calculation in CS
Upon receiving the encrypted seven-tuple, CS calculates a preliminary seven-tuple for attack detection. Then, a CS sends the results to DS using TLS.
The calculation process in CS is exhibited in Algorithm 3. Predis employs a kNN for attack detection; thus, the computing distance is an important step. We calculate the preliminary results of the distance between the test data and the training data. CS directly calculates the preliminary results in the received encrypted seven-tuple and obtains the distance between the disturbance data and the training data. We leave the work of removal of the perturbation and obtaining the exact result of distance to DS. A schematic is shown in Figure 4(a) .
C. Attack Detection in DS
The attack detection process in DS is abstracted in Figure 4 (b) and exhibited in Algorithm 4. After receiving the domains' perturbation parameters and CS's preliminary results of the distance, DS removes the perturbation from the preliminary results to obtain the correct distance. The improved kNN uses the correct distance to obtain the correct for ∀t ∈ T do 3: for ∀d t ∈ D t do 4: P reR = D t − t.
5:
for ∀preR ∈ P reR do 6: C DS ← Enc skc (preR).
7:
return C DS to DS. for ∀preR ∈ P reR do 3: for ∀r ∈ R do 4: f anlR = preR − r.
Algorithm 4 Attack Detection in DS
5:
Doing attack detection by using F anlR. 6: Obtain the detection result A by Algorithm 1.
7:
return A to domains. detection results. If the classifier identifies DDoS attacks, DS will return the alarm (Serial Number and Time) to the domains. The domains' operator will appropriately respond after receiving an alarm.
The calculation results of CS are the training data D t minus the perturbed seven-tuple ΔT (D t − ΔT ). Since DS has the perturbation parameters R, it can obtain the correct distance for attack detection using the perturbation parameters with the calculation results of CS (D t − ΔT − R) subtracted. The improved kNN calculates the results of the DDoS attack detection.
D. Implementation
The roles in Predis include two servers and SDN controllers. Predis can prevent the collusion between at least one domain and one server; thus, the two servers can be deployed in any of the participating domains or wherever secure communications are provided for the domains over the TLS protocol. In addition, some operators that provide computing services can be employed to deploy these two servers, which ensures that the two servers are not deployed in the same interest group.
The data plane and the control plane of the SDNs communicate using a control-data-plane interface (CDPI) [44] . The main use of the uniform communication standard is the Open-Flow protocol [45] . The flow table operations, which include flow table pretreatment, communication with the server, and proper handling for DDoS alerts or other operations, can be deployed and implemented via the use of the southbound interfaces (i.e., CDPI).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As described in Section III-C, our security goal is to protect the privacy of each input peer. Predis uses TLS to protect privacy in the data transmission process. TLS is generally accepted as secure for data transfer across a network [46] . In addition to the correct data receiver, any external eavesdropper cannot eavesdrop and tamper data. Therefore, we do not analyze the security of TLS here.
A scheme is secure if any PPT adversary succeeds in breaking the scheme with negligible probability [42] . If a PPT adversary succeeds in the indistinguishable experiment shown in Table III with negligible probability, we can assume that the scheme is secure. We can apply an asymptotic approach in model cryptography to prove the security of a scheme and present the proofs by showing the indistinguishability in the following two situations. For CS and DS, the input peers' private information is indistinguishable, whereas other input peers' private information is indistinguishable for domains.
Prior to the formal security analysis, we define each representation: T is the private information mentioned in Section III-C; T is the set of encrypted T ; R is the disturbance parameter of each domain; and P reR is the preliminary calculation's result output by CS. In addition, a private-key encryption scheme is defined by specifying the message space M with three algorithms [42] : a procedure for generating keys (Gen), which is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a key k; a procedure for encrypting (Enc), which takes as inputs the key k and the message m and outputs the ciphertext c; and a procedure for decrypting (Dec), which takes as inputs the key k and the ciphertext c and outputs the plaintext m.
Regarding the domains, the legal data domains have unique data and detection results. When they attempt to gain privacy from others, such as via an external eavesdropper, privacy is indistinguishable.
For CS, the legal data are expressed as T = T + R. We construct the encryption scheme Π CS , as shown in Table IV . We provide and prove a theorem (Theorem 1) for the scheme. If CS does not collude with domains, it is merely a ciphertext-only eavesdropping adversary at this point. If CS colludes with at least one domains, this attack would be a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in construction Π CS 's encryption scheme. In a ciphertext-only attack, the only thing the adversary needs to do is eavesdrop on the public communication channel over which encrypted messages are sent [42] . In the chosen-plaintext attack the adversary is assumed to be able to obtain encryptions and/or decryptions of plaintexts/ciphertexts of its choice [42] . The chosen-plaintext adversary has more useful information than the ciphertextonly adversary, and the chosen-plaintext adversary is harder to prevent than the ciphertext-only adversary. When we stop the chosen-plaintext adversary, we can stop the ciphertext-only adversary. By Proof 1, we demonstrate that Construction Π CS is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length l. Thus, input peers' private information is indistinguishable for CS.
Theorem 1: If G is a pseudorandom function, then Construction Π CS is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length l.
Proof 1: Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme that is identical to the scheme employed in Π CS , with the exception that a truly random function g is substituted for G k . Fix an arbitrary PPT adversary A, and let q(n) be an upper bound on the number of queries that A (1 n ) makes to its encryption oracle. We demonstrate the negligible function ε(n) and prove it by reduction. P r P rivK cpa A·ΠCS (n)= 1 −P r P rivK cpa A·ΠCS (n)= 1 = ε(n)
We use A to construct the distinguisher D for the pseudorandom function G. The distinguisher D is given oracle access to some function O and its goal is to determine whether this function is "pseudorandom" (i.e., equal to G k for uniform k ∈ {0, 1} n or "random"). D emulates the experiment P rivK cpa for A in the following manner and observes whether A succeeds or fails. If A succeeds, then D assumes that its oracle must be a pseudorandom function; however, if A does not succeed, then D assumes that its oracle must be a random function. D runs in polynomial time since A runs in polynomial time. The key points are described as follows:
If D's oracle is a pseudorandom function, then the view of A when running as a subroutine by D is identically distributed to the view of A in the experiment P rivK cpa A·ΠCS (n). In this case, the key k is uniformly and randomly chosen, and then every encryption is performed by choosing a uniform r and setting the ciphertext to r, G(K) + m, as demonstrated in Construction Π CS .
If D's oracle is a random function, then the view of A when running as a subroutine by D is identically distributed to the view of A in the experiment P rivK cpa A·ΠCS (n), where the only difference is that a uniform function is employed instead of G k . 
In Formula (3), we know that P r P rivK cpa A·ΠCS (n) = 1 = 1 2
. Combining this formula and the assumption that G is a pseudorandom function, the negligible function ε(n) exists for which P r P rivK CS A·ΠCS (n) = 1 = 1 2 + ε(n). From Definition 2, we have proved that Construction Π CS is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length l.
For DS, the legal data are R and P reR. Since P reR = D t − T and T = T +R, DS has legal data D t −T . We construct an encryption scheme Π DS as shown in Table V . If DS does not collude with at least one domain, it is a ciphertextonly eavesdropping adversary at this point for the encryption scheme Π DS . If DS colludes with at least one domain and does not have other CS's private keys, they would be unable to obtain other input peers' T . DS owns the perturbation parameter P reR. Therefore, this situation is CPA-secure in the encryption scheme Π DS , which is stated in Theorem 2.
In Proof 2, we demonstrate that input peers' private information is indistinguishable for DS. 
In general, the training data set for kNN has 2500 records; each record comprises 32*5=160 bits in our scheme. Thus,
With the idea of an asymptotic approach, we consider that D (k) negligible.
In the chosen-plaintext attack, P r P rivK DS A·ΠDS (n) = 1
can be equal to 1 2 + q(n) 2 2500×160 , where q(n) is the number of queries to the Oracle.
If Q(n) is a polynomial about n, ε(n) * Q(n) remains negligible. In the encryption scheme Π DS , q(n) is a polynomial about the number of collusive domains; thus, q(n) 2 2500×160 is negligible. The encryption scheme Π DS has indistinguishable encryptions in a chosen-plaintext attack.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates Predis in terms of accuracy, expansibility, time consumption, and compatibility.
A. Preliminary
Dataset: Since simulating the attack scenarios has a major defect in terms of traffic diversity, we employ five sets of public traffic traces for our experiments, including the CAIDA "DDoS attacks 2007" traces [47] , the CAIDA Anonymized 2008 Internet traces [48] , the 2000 DARPA LLDOS 1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.2 traces [5], the 1999 DARPA traces [5], and the KDD Cup 1999 traces [49] . We deploy a DDoS attacks experiment and capture relevant traffic traces for our experiments. The file format of these datasets is .pcap, which pertains to every packets' detail. We parse these .pcap files by flow statistics to simulate the flow table collected by a controller in the SDNs.
Using the combinations of these traces, we define three datasets for the experiments. Table VI. Dataset 2: All traffic in the CAIDA were collected from both directions of an OC-192 Internet backbone link by CAID's equinix-chicago monitor. In Dataset 2, we use the CAIDA Anonymized 2008 Internet traces as normal traffic and the CAIDA "DDoS attacks 2007" traces as anomaly traffic.
Dataset 3: We employed Python and Scapy 3 to achieve the simulation of a synchronous (SYN) flood attack. To simulate DDoS attacks, we used five hosts to launch SYN flood attacks against a host and then collected five minutes of abnormal traffic on this victim host. To obtain the abnormal traffic that was as clean as possible, when collecting abnormal traffic, we closed all applications on the victim host. We collected another 45 minutes of normal traffic on this victim host when no attacks occurred. Statistics of Dataset 3 are shown in Table VII .
In addition, the KDD Cup 1999 traces are separately employed to evaluate the performance of Predis with regard to compatibility. Statistics of the KDD Cup 1999 traces are provided in Table IX .
Cross-Validation: To evaluate the performance difference between Predis and others, we employ cross-validation for each dataset. Table VIII .
Methods to Compare: Predis is a privacy-preserving cross-domain detection in SDNs. To evaluate the performance of Predis in a comprehensive manner, we select three state-of-the-art methods for comparison, i.e., SVM, SOM, and PSOM. Kokila et al. [18] leverage an SVM to perform DDoS attack detection in SDNs, where a high accuracy rate has been achieved. Braga et al. [26] use an SOM to perform DDoS attack detection in SDNs. A PSOM is a cross-domain DDoS detection scheme that uses an SOM as the classifier and introduces privacy-preserving proposed by Bian et al. [20] . Linear kNN (kNN) is implemented to clear the improvement toward kNN in Predis in terms of speed. We disable the privacy-preserving function in Predis and name it PkNN. Naive Bayes (NB) is also implemented to achieve a better understanding.
Comparison Criteria: The fundamental goal of attack detection is accuracy (i.e., identifying more anomalies in the ground truth and avoiding false alarms) [46] . We apply precision ( #correctly divided into attack f lows #correctly and f alsely divided into attack f lows ) and recall ( #correctly divided into attack f lows #all attack f lows ) to measure the detection accuracy.
B. Evaluation of Classifier Performance 1) Selection of the Best k Value:
To obtain the best k value for the improved kNN in Predis, we observe the changes in time consumption, precision, and recall when gradually k increases from five to 35, where the privacy-preserving component in Predis is temporarily disabled. Subsequently, we determine and select the best k value for our scheme. The experimental data for evaluation is the Sample 1 in Dataset 2. The training dataset size is 2400, including 1200 normal traffic instances and 1200 abnormal traffic instances, whose scale remains unchanged in the following experiments.
The experimental results are depicted in Figure 5 , where the vertical coordinates represent changes in the k value. Figure 5 (b) exhibit the evaluation results of precision (recall) and time consumption, respectively. We discover that an appropriate k value lies between 20 and 25, where Predis achieves relatively high accuracy without introducing substantial time overhead. Thus, we choose a k value of 23 in the following experiments.
2) Classifier Performance: To better comprehend the performance of the classifier in Predis with regard to speed and accuracy, we conduct cross-validation in Dataset 2 and make a comparison among Predis, PkNN, PSOM, SOM, SVM and NB. We calculate the average of the results in six cross-validation experiments and plot the precision and recall in Figure 6 (a) and the time consumption in Figure 6 (b). In addition, we conduct a comparison among Predis, PkNN, kNN, PSOM, SOM, SVM and NB using Dataset 3; the results are depicted in Figure 6 (c) and Figure 6(d) .
To evaluate the impact of privacy-preserving in Predis on detection accuracy, we compare the accuracy between Predis and PkNN. When we detailed Predis in Section V-C, we have proved by theoretical analysis that the detection results after introducing privacy protection will not have any impact on detection accuracy. This conclusion is validated in Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (c), where Predis and PkNN obtain the same detection accuracy.
As shown in Figure 6 , compared with other algorithms, kNN has not only high accuracy but also no training time. Although kNN does not have the lowest time consumption, it was selected as the classifier in Predis because it is easy to calculate (cf., Section IV-A), which facilitates embedding the encryption steps into it, and has relatively higher accuracy, which have been confirmed in this experiment. In addition, we use some algorithms (kd-tree and BBF) to improve the speed of kNN. As shown in Figure 6 (b) and Figure 6(d) , the time consumption of PkNN is less than that of kNN, which verifies the improvement of PkNN in time consumption.
Predis divides the original kNN into two calculation modules: distance calculation and classification. Thus, we consider the time spent in the CS as the training process time, as shown in Figure 6 (b) and Figure 6 Table X , we discover that the precision and recall of single-domain detection is lower than the precision and recall of cross-domain detection, which undoubtedly proves our stance that DDoS attack detection in cross-domain is necessary. We also observe that Predis is superior to PSOM in terms of precision and recall. In domain 172. 16 .115.*, both Predis and PSOM have low precision and recall. Fewer hosts are invaded by attackers in domain 172. 16 .115.*, and invaded hosts have not generated significant abnormal traffic. The lack of training dataset results in not highlighted in the detection results. However, Predis's precision and recall remains above 0.88.
2) Accuracy Evaluation of Detecting DDoS Attacks at Early
Stages: Detecting DDoS attacks at the first and second stages is desirable. We conducted cross-validation in Dataset 1 and divided Dataset 1's traces into three stages (scanning, intrusion, and attacking). In both the attack scanning stage and the intrusion stage, Predis delivers excellent detection results, as shown in Table XI , which indicates that Predis can identify attacks at early stages. In contrast to PSOM, Predis achieves better detection results at any stage of the attack and the detection results at the stages of scanning and intrusion is suboptimal. The precision of Predis is 0.9919 when LLDOS 1.0 is utilized as the training dataset at the attacking stage. 
D. Evaluation of Scalability
Using Dataset 1, we record the changes in time consumption and accuracy when the number of domains increases from one to six. The detection effect remains almost unchanged, as shown in Table XII , when the number of domains increases. The time consumption of Predis does not surge and satisfies the linear variations as the number of domains increases, as shown in Figure 7 (a) and Figure 7 (b). With an increase in the number of domains, Predis has a distinct advantage in terms of time-consumption compared with PSOM.
We analyze the MAWI dataset [50] , which is based on the collected network traffic during seven years of a specific link between Japan and the USA. The backbone generates approximately 6,000 KB (130,000 flows) of traffic per second. If we can process 13,000 flows per second (1/10 of the traffic generated by this backbone line), Predis can satisfy the time-consumption requirement. The time spent is the sum of the time spent between CS and DS. We record the time spent on two servers when the amount of test instances increase from 1,000 to 10,000, where Dataset 2 is employed. As shown in Figure 7 (c), when 10,000 flows are utilized for testing, the total time does not exceed one second. With privacy-preserving, the time consumption of Predis is also acceptable.
Using Dataset 2, we record the time spent in six crossvalidation experiments, where PSOM is the control group and the results are shown in Figure 7(d) . As shown in Figure 7(d) , compared with PSOM with a similar scheme PSOM, Predis has a lower time consumption.
E. Evaluation of Detecting Other Attacks
We hope that the attack detection scheme will detect not only DDOS attacks but also other attacks. Our evaluation confirms that Predis is suitable for detecting not only DDOS attacks but also a variety of attacks and retains excellent accuracy after properly changing the feature selection model. We conduct experiments using the KDD Cup 1999 traces, which have several other types of attacks in addition to DDoS attacks. The feature selection model is a four-tuple (Count, Src bytes, Dst bytes, Logged in).
1) Time Consumption Evaluation When Detecting Other Attacks:
We detect three types of attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 traces-DOS, Prob, and U2R-and record the time required and the accuracy. The results are depicted in Table XIII .
2) Accuracy Evaluation When Detecting Other Attacks: We detect three types of attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 traces-DOS, Prob, and U2R-and record the accuracy in Table XIV, where SOM and SVM are compared.
When detecting attacks of DoS, Prob, and U2R, the precision of Predis exceeds 90%. Compared with the same privacy-preserving scheme PSOM, Predis is better in terms of time consumption (as shown in Table XIII ). In the KDD Cup 1999 traces, U2R attacks have few abnormal traffic instances. Therefore, recall is relative low when testing U2R attacks. Compared with SVM and SOM, Predis is superior with regard to precision and recall (as shown in Table XIV ). Based on these two experiments, Predis can accurately detect not only DDoS attacks but also other attacks when appropriately selected features are incorporated.
VIII. DISCUSSION
If SDNs controllers can identify DDoS attacks in the early stages and take corresponding measures (e.g., limiting the SYN/ICMP traffic, filtering specific IP addresses, and traffic cleaning), SDN controllers can prevent DDoS attacks before they cause damage. SDNs apply centralized control for the traffic forwarding mechanism that makes it easier to stop DDoS attacks. Predis is capable of detecting DDoS attacks in the early stages of an attack XI). Once a server detects a DDoS attack, it alerts the controller, which immediately responds to the alert to prevent any further damage from the attack.
Due to the development of different network access technologies and different communication systems, resource scheduling and fusion in heterogeneous networks have become controversial topics [51] . SDNs can achieve unified management in configuration heterogeneous network equipment and open a variety of interfaces. However, these interfaces are exploited by attackers in events such as tapping, interception and DDoS attacks. We can regard heterogeneous networks as a domain under the unified management of a SDN. Using Predis, users can achieve secure cross-domain DDoS attack detection and resist threats from DDoS attacks in heterogeneous networks.
In addition, Predis's idea of providing cross-domain privacy protection may also be transplanted to other application scenarios in the future to achieve secure multi-party computing. Overlay networks such as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) add virtual channels to physical networks to enhance network flexibility. Each node in P2P networks may be a data provider. When monitoring the traffic of multiple nodes without compromising privacy, each node in P2P can be considered a domain. The idea of Predis in cross-domain detection can be applied to provide a security monitoring service.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a SDN-based cross-domain attack detection scheme with privacy protection. We investigated cross-domain privacy protection problems and DDoS attack detection based on SDNs. We combined geometric transformation and a data encryption method with the objective of protecting privacy. We divided the detection process into two step-disturbance and detection-and introduced two servers that collaborate to complete the detection process. We optimized the kNN for low time consumption and high accuracy. Extensive experimental results revealed that Predis is capable of detecting cross-domain anomalies while preserving privacy with low time consumption and high accuracy. We plan to further reduce the time consumption of Predis in attack detection in future studies.
